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Any human-induced changes in climate will be modulated by natural fluctuations of the oceans and atmosphere (for example, El Niño events). These fluctuations occur randomly and independently, in both reality and individual model-based projections, and act to obscure the climate change signal [3] [4] [5] . Mora et al. 1 discuss projections of when changes in climate emerge permanently above the levels of such fluctuations (a metric first considered in ref. 6 ). However, by ignoring the irreducible limits imposed by these same random fluctuations, Mora et al.
1 express their emergence dates with too much certainty.
Several methodological oversights contribute to the erroneous uncertainty quantification. First, Mora et al. 1 ignore the possibility that emergence dates before the end of the simulations are not permanent deviations from the historical range 6 (termed 'pseudo-emergence'). In many regions where emergence has not occurred by the year 2100, Mora et al. 1 artificially set the emergence date to equal 2100. This oversight produces several effects, including: (1) early and overconfident estimates of regional temperature emergence; and (2) implausible emergence dates for precipitation of exactly 2100 with zero uncertainty almost everywhere.
Second, Mora et al. 1 estimate precision of regional emergence timing using the standard error of the ensemble mean (s/!N), where N (539) is the number of simulations and s is their standard deviation. While the estimate of the ensemble-mean becomes more precise with larger ensemble size, natural fluctuations of the climate (such as El Niño) dictate that the future evolution of climate will not behave like the ensemble mean, but as a single realization from a range of outcomes 5, 7 . The use of s/!N greatly underestimates 8 
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as well as the climate-response uncertainty given by the inter-model spread, and is therefore inappropriate for use in emergence estimates. Given N 5 39 simulations, there is greater than 85% chance that the actual emergence time at any location will fall outside the uncertainty values of ref. 1 , and an infinite number of simulations would implausibly suggest zero uncertainty in the projected emergence time. Nor can the standard error simply be scaled to a more appropriate uncertainty range (for example, a 16%-84% range, equivalent to 61s for a normal distribution), partly because the 'right-censored' emergence results of ref.
1 have an explicit upper-bound of 2100, making their distribution highly non-normal.
To demonstrate the impact of these oversights, we have replicated the analysis of ref. 1 for surface air temperature using: (1) a multimodel ensemble of simulations that extends to the year 2300; and (2) a large ensemble of simulations from a single model that extends to 2115.
Mora et al. 1 report that their ''index has a global mean of 2069 (618 years s.d.) for near-surface air temperature'' in the RCP4.5 forcing pathway, where ''s.d.'' refers to the spatial standard deviation of their grid-point means. However, the end-of-simulation effects invalidate the concept of a global mean permanent emergence date. Even apparent emergence years as early as 2050 may not actually permanently emerge until post-2100, as evidenced by the time of divergence between dashed and solid lines in Fig. 1a . Further, 41% (multi-model median) of the pre-2100 emergence values (by area) are either pseudo-emergent (31%) or artificially set to 2100 (10%). We also find that no model shows permanent emergence everywhere by 2100, or even by 2250. The large fraction of grid points exhibiting post-2100 emergence also highlights the underestimation of spatial emergence variability: whereas Mora et al.
1 report a spatial s.d. of 618 years, the 16-84% grid-point range is .150 years for virtually all of the models (see specific example for CSIRO Mk3.6 model in Fig. 1a) . Finally, while some global-median emergence estimates using post-2100 data are similar to the global-mean (and global-median) estimates using only pre-2100 data, such agreement is fortuitous-as evidenced by the substantial delay in several models (compare coloured circles and stars in Fig. 1a )-and should not be expected a priori for the multi-model mean values from ref. 1 .
The large single-model ensemble helps clarify the spatial pattern of irreducible uncertainty (Fig. 1b) . In this ensemble, 61% of the planet exhibits the possibility of post-2100 emergence, thwarting the calculation of mean emergence and biological impacts in these regions (including Amazonia and the Southern Ocean which are in the biodiversity hotspots of ref. 1). In addition, the standard errors (as used by Mora et al.
1
) are less than 6 years everywhere, whereas the irreducible 16-84% uncertainty range is more than 6 years everywhere, and 75% of the planet has a 16-84% range of more than 20 years. Note that inter-model uncertainty will further increase the spread in grid-point emergence times (compare the multi-model spread with the shaded intra-model spread in Fig. 1a) , and decrease the coverage of well-defined grid-point averages. Finally, while the delay in emergence and increase in uncertainty is evident for annual temperatures (the primary metric of ref. 1), it will be more pronounced for other variables analysed 1 , such as monthly temperatures and precipitation, but less pronounced for annual temperatures in higher forcing pathways.
Last, the main conclusion of ref. 
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We use simulations of surface air temperature from 13 global climate models (GCMs) given historical radiative forcings from 1860-2005 and the RCP4.5 forcing pathway from 2006-2300. We estimate the unprecedented emergence time for every grid point in each simulation independently. The cumulative fraction of emergence (Fig. 1a) shows the proportion of the surface area of the planet that has emerged by each year. The emergence calculations are repeated while restricting the data to end in either 2100 or 2300. We also use an ensemble of 30 simulations of the CSIRO Mk3.6 GCM 20 which were given the same radiative forcings for the period 1860-2115. The CSIRO GCM is chosen because of the availability of the large ensemble of simulations and its similarity to the multi-model mean/median behaviour. This ensemble of emergence years is used to estimate the grid-point averages and uncertainty ranges (Figs 1b-e of the projected timing of climate departure from recent variability is biased to occur too early and is given with overestimated confidence. We contest their assertions and maintain that our findings are conservative and remain unaltered in light of their analysis. We presented an index 2 that quantifies the year after which the climate continuously exceeds the bounds of historical variability, using 39 CMIP5 Earth System Models. Uncertainty in climate projections from these models arises chiefly from natural ('internal') climate variability, model error and uncertainty in the future evolution of greenhouse gas concentrations 3 . Hawkins et al. 1 suggest that by ''ignoring the irreducible limits imposed by… random fluctuations, Mora et al.
2 express their emergence dates with too much certainty''. However, our index was calculated independently for individual model simulations, which include internal variability. By considering individual simulations (internal variability) from each of 39 models (model-to-model error), under two emission pathways (scenario uncertainty), our results account for the three major sources of uncertainty in climate projections.
Our analysis of climate departure included only projections to the year 2100 due to their greater availability (only a third of the CMIP5 models have projections beyond 2100). Hawkins et al.
1 assert that the use of model projections to the year 2100 reduces the global mean timing of climate departure because we assigned the year 2100 to cells where unprecedented climates might occur after 2100. This is a valid constraint, and thus, climate departure at 2100 in our results should be interpreted as emergence that will occur in 2100 or later, or not at all.
The implications of using projections to 2100 are, however, exaggerated by Hawkins et al. 1 . First, we recalculated our index using the multi-model median, which is less affected than the mean by outlier projections of climate departure after 2100, and found only small differences. The global median temperature departure was 2076 under RCP4.5 (the reported global mean was 2069) and 2045 under RCP8.5 (the reported global mean was 2047). The multi-model median delivers similar results to the mean, even if projections to 2300 are used. For instance, the analysis in ref. 1 shows that 7 out of 13 models exhibit similar or even earlier global median temperature departures using projections to 2300 compared to global mean based on projections to 2100 (upper plot in figure 1a in ref. 1) . Second, Hawkins et al.
1 chose RCP4.5, stating that the limitation is ''less pronounced for annual temperatures in higher forcing pathways''. Indeed, by 2080, 97% of the planet will face temperature departure for the remainder of the twenty-first century under RCP8.5. Under the RCP4.5 pathway, 67% of the planet will face temperature departure by 2080, highlighting the imminent departure of Earth's climate even under an optimistic mitigation scenario. Finally, from a global biological and social perspective, the potential limitation associated with climate departures beyond 2100 is small, as it is relevant only to high latitudes and not for areas where the majority of people and species on the planet live.
Any statistical value should be interpreted based on the metric it represents. Hawkins et al. 1 claim that by reporting the standard error of the mean our results are given with too much confidence. Our paper is transparent and clearly states that the standard error of the mean was our metric of uncertainty among models, and although the values provided should be interpreted in the context of that metric, they can easily be converted to another choice of statistic if so desired (for example, our standard error can be multiplied by ffiffiffiffi N p to obtain the standard deviation). Hawkins et al. 1 further suggest that the standard error is the wrong choice as ''the future evolution of climate will not behave like the mean, but as a single realization from a range of outcomes''. In other words, all models' simulations are equally likely, and thus, statistics that describe the broad range of projections are more suitable. This premise, however, conflicts with findings that it is the multi-model average that best approximates mean observed conditions, often better than any individual model, as demonstrated by prior studies 4 and confirmed in our paper 2 . Although there is no established ''correct'' way to express uncertainty, at least for the results from Earth System Models that can be verified, metrics of variability around the consensus mean are more appropriate.
Hawkins et al. 1 also suggested that the standard deviation cannot be scaled to their suggested 16-84% range multi-model dispersion as the climate departures are not normally distributed. However, ''contrary to popular misconception, the standard deviation is a valid measure of variability regardless of the distribution. About 95% of observations on any distribution usually fall within 2 standard deviation limits…'' 5 . We recalculated multi-model uncertainty as the standard deviation and as the 16-84% range among model projections for temperature and found small differences. The global median multi-model uncertainty estimates by these two metrics differ by 2.5 years under RCP4.5 and 1.6 years under RCP8.5.
Our paper 2 used all (not a subset) of the latest generation of Earth System Models that have complete projections for RCP4.5, RCP8.5 and historical experiments, under very conservative criteria for estimating climate departure (for example, using the minimum and maximum BRIEF COMMUNICATIONS ARISING
